Migration and regional interdependence in the Mediterranean, from the early 1980s to the mid 1990s by COMTE, Emmanuel
 Nomos
Edited by
The European Union Liaison 
Commitee of Historians
JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION HISTORY
The purpose of The Journal of European Integration History is to encourage the analysis and 
understanding of different aspects of European integration, especially since 1945, in as wide a 
perspective as possible. The Journal publishes the conclusions of research on diplomatic, military, 
economic, technological, social and cultural aspects of integration. Numbers devoted to single 
themes as well as to diverse subjects are published in English, French or German. Each number 
includes reviews of important, relevant publications.
REVUE D’HISTOIRE DE L’INTÉGRATION EUROPÉENNE
L’objectif de la Revue d’histoire de l’intégration européenne est de promouvoir l’analyse et la 
compréhension des différents aspects de l’intégration européenne particulièrement depuis 1945, 
mais sans exclusive. La Revue publie les résultats des recherches sur les aspects diplomatiques, 
militaires, économiques, technologiques, sociaux et culturels de l’intégration. Les numéros à thème 
ou ceux ouverts à diverses perspectives sont publiés dans l’une des langues suivantes: anglais, 
français, allemand. Chaque numéro comprend des comptes rendus d’ouvrages importants.
ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR GESCHICHTE DER EUROPÄISCHEN INTEGRATION
Die Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration bietet ein Forum zur Erforschung 
des europäischen Integrationsprozesses in allen Aspekten: den politischen, militärischen, 
wirtschaftlichen, technologischen, sozialen und kulturellen. Ihren Schwerpunkt bilden Beiträge zu 
den konkreten Einigungsprojekten seit 1945, doch werden auch Arbeiten zu den Vorläufern und 
Vorbereitungen publiziert. Die Zeitschrift erscheint zweimal im Jahr. Neben Themenheften stehen 
„offene“ Ausgaben, und jedesmal werden auch Besprechungen wichtiger Neuerscheinungen 
veröffentlicht. Die Beiträge eines internationalen Autorenkreises erscheinen in englischer, 
französischer oder deutscher Sprache.
Contents
Elena CALANDRI, Simone PAOLI
Europe and the Mediterranean in the long 1980s
Evanthis HATZIVASSILIOU
The Cold War as a Frontier: The Mediterranean 
Cleavages and the View from NATO, 1967-1982
Karin LIEBHART
Images of the Mediterranean in Late 20th Century 
German Quality Press
Sofia PAPASTAMKOU
Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 
1981-1986.The Israeli-Palestinian Conflict and the 
Greek-Libyan Relations as Case Studies
Claudia CASTIGLIONI
The EEC and Iran: From the Revolution of 1979 to 
the Launch of the Critical Dialogue in 1992
Massimiliano TRENTIN
Divergence in the Mediterranean.The Economic 
Relations Between the EC and the Arab Countries 
in the Long 1980s
Emmanuel COMTE
Migration and Regional Interdependence in  
the Mediterranean, from the Early 1980s to the 
Mid 1990s
Simone PAOLI
The Schengen Agreements and their Impact on 
Euro-Mediterranean RelationsThe Case of Italy  
and the Maghreb
Jo
ur
na
l o
f E
ur
op
ea
n 
In
te
gr
at
io
n 
H
is
to
ry
  ■
  2
01
5 
 ■  
 V
ol
um
e 
21
  ■
 
 N
um
be
r 1
2015
Volume 21  
ISSN 0947-9511
1
Journal of European Integration History 
Revue d’Histoire de l’Intégration Européenne 
Zeitschrift für Geschichte der europäischen Integration
Contents /  Table des matières /  Inhalt
Elena CALANDRI, Simone PAOLI
Europe and the Mediterranean in the long 1980s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Evanthis HATZIVASSILIOU
The Cold War as a Frontier:The Mediterranean Cleavages and the View from
NATO, 1967-1982 ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Karin LIEBHART
Images of the Mediterranean in Late 20 th Century German Quality Press .. . . . . . . . 33
Sofia PAPASTAMKOU
Greece between Europe and the Mediterranean, 1981-1986.The Israeli-Palest inian
Conflict  and the Greek-Libyan Relations as Case Studies .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
Claudia CASTIGLIONI
The EEC and Iran: From the Revolution of 1979 to the Launch of the Crit ical
Dialogue in 1992 .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
Massimiliano TRENTIN
Divergence in the Mediterranean.The Economic Relations Between the EC and
the Arab Countries in the Long 1980s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
Journal of European Integrat ion History 1/2015
Revue d’Histoire de l’Intégrat ion Européenne
Zeitschrift  für Geschichte der europäischen Integrat ion
Volume 21
Pages 1-196
Editors: Published twice a year by the European Union Liaison Committee of Historians (Groupe de
liaison des professeurs d’histoire contemporaine auprès de la Commission européenne). This
publication is part  of the Network EU-History based at  the Kulturwissenschaft liches Inst itut  Essen.
It  is financed by the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg.
Editorial Board: Antonio VARSORI (chairman), Università di Padova (Jean Monnet Chair) |  Charles
BARTHEL, Centre Robert  Schuman | Gérard BOSSUAT, Université de Cergy-Pontoise (Jean Monnet
Chair) |  Elena CALANDRI, Università degli Studi di Padova | Michel DUMOULIN, Université catholique
de Louvain (Jean Monnet Chair) |  Michael GEHLER, Universität  Hildesheim (Jean Monnet Chair) |
Fernando GUIRAO, Universitat  Pompeu Fabra, Barcelona (Jean Monnet Chair) |  Johnny LAURSEN,
University of Aarhus |  Wilfried LOTH, Universität  Essen | N. Piers LUDLOW, London School of
Economics |  Kiran Klaus PATEL, Maastricht  University |  Nicolae PĂUN, University of Cluj-Napoca |
Sylvain SCHIRMANN, Institut  d'études polit iques, Strasbourg |  Gilbert  TRAUSCH, Centre Robert
Schuman, Université de Liège |  Jan VAN der HARST, University of Groningen (Jean Monnet Chair)
www.eu-historians.eu |  www.cere.public.lu
Editorial Secretariat : Charles Barthel, director, Centre d’études et  de recherches européennes, Robert
Schuman, 4 rue Jules Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg, Tel.: (00  352) 24 78 22 90 , Fax.: (00  352) 42 27 97,
E-Mail: crs@cere.etat .lu; Charles.Barthel@cere.etat .lu
Emmanuel COMTE
Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean, from the Early
1980s to the Mid 1990s .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
Simone PAOLI
The Schengen Agreements and their Impact on Euro-Mediterranean
RelationsThe Case of Italy and the Maghreb .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
Book reviews – Comptes rendus – Buchbesprechungen .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 147
PhD Theses – Thèses de doctorat  – Doktorarbeiten . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 175
Abstracts – Résumés – Zusammenfassungen .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181
Contributors – Auteurs – Autoren .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 191
Books received – Livres reçus – Eingegangene Bücher . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 193
Impressum
Editorial Secretariat : Charles Barthel, director |  Centre d’études et  de recherches européennes,
Robert  Schuman | 4 rue Jules Wilhelm | L-2728 Luxembourg | Tel.: (00  352) 24 78 22 90  | Fax.: (00  352)
42 27 97 | E-Mail: crs@cere.etat .lu or Charles.Barthel@cere.etat .lu
Website: www.zgei.nomos.de
Annual subscription: 88,– ¤, annual subscription |  Single issues: 46,– ¤, Prices do not include postage
and packing.
Payments can be made:
– By cheques payable to Nomos Verlag
– By bank transfers to Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft , Postbank Karlsruhe: bank code 660  100  75, account
no. 73636-751 or Sparkasse Baden-Baden Gaggenau: bank code 662 500  30 , account no. – 5-002266.
Please ensure your quote „JEIH“ when instructing your bank and enclose a copy of your instructions
to the bank with your order.
– By credit  card (VISA, Masters, Eurocard).
Orders: Subscriptions and orders should be sent  to: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft  mbH, D-76520  Baden-
Baden, Germany.
Inquiries concerning advert isements should be sent  to the Editorial Secretariat , Centre d’études et  de
recherches européennes Robert  Schuman, 4 rue Jules Wilhelm, L-2728 Luxembourg.
Cancellat ion Period: Termination within 3 months notice to the end of the year.
Production and Publishing: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft  mbH & Co. KG, Waldseestr. 3-5, D-76530  Baden-
Baden, Telefone 0  72 21 /  21 04-0 , Telefax 0  72 21 /  21 04-27, E-Mail: nomos@nomos.de.
Advert isement: Sales friendly, Verlagsdienstleistungen, Pfaffenweg 15, 53227 Bonn, Telefone 0228 /
9 78 98-0 , Fax 02 28 /  9 78 98-20 , E-Mail: roos@sales-friendly.de.
Copyright  and Right of Publishing: The journal, including all contributions and images, is protected by
copyright . For every reprinting rights the permission of the publishing company is required.
ISSN 0947-9511
Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean,
from the Early 1980s to the Mid 1990s
Emmanuel COMTE
Since the early 1980s, migration between Mediterranean countries has intensified.1
The increased flow of people across international borders with the prospect of lasting
settlement has linked the countries of the Mediterranean basin. This happened at a
time of growing regional integration between Mediterranean states, until the
Barcelona Euro-Mediterranean Ministerial Conference of 27 and 28 November 1995,
the final declaration of which intended to create a lasting partnership between the
European Union (EU) and twelve countries in the Eastern and Southern Mediter-
ranean. Studying the relationship between these growing migration flows and this
movement of regional cooperation matters in order to better understand international
relations in the Mediterranean region and the factors of regional cooperation, as well
as to think about the prospects of this cooperation. For about twenty years, following
the development of the Barcelona Process and the Union for the Mediterranean,
political scientists have developed some historiography of trans-Mediterranean
cooperation. This historiography has already highlighted that Southern European
states have been the protagonists in this development. The political scientist Richard
Gillespie considered that “the motors of the Barcelona process [were] Spain and
France”.2 The historiography has also highlighted the divergence of interests between
Northern European states and Southern European states over trans-Mediterranean
cooperation, and has explained the limited results achieved in trans-Mediterranean
cooperation owing to the reluctance of the former. Yet the main dynamic, namely the
motivations of Southern European states, has insufficiently been explained and it is
these motives that this article aims to better present. To this end, this article aims to
highlight the migration factor in the position of Southern European states. By South-
ern European states, this article means Portugal, Spain, France, Italy, and Greece.
The explanatory framework of this article resorts to the concepts of interdepen-
dence developed by the political scientists Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye.3 Theo-
retically, international relations consist of interactions between actors. The most im-
portant actors in international relations are states. This assumption does not exclude
other types of actors on those states’ territories, for instance unions, shaping states’
preferences. The interactions between states might be the result of commercial flows,
1. I would like to thank the organisers of the November 2013 Padua Conference on the Origins of the
Euro-Med Partnership: Elena Calandri, Simone Paoli and Antonio Varsori. I would like to thank in
particular the discussant of my paper at this conference, from which this article is drawn, Lorenzo
Mechi. Finally I thank the JEIH anonymous reviewers for their comments.
2. R. Gillespie, Northern European Perceptions of the Barcelona Process, in: Afers Internacionals,
37(1997), p.65.
3. R.O. KEOHANE, J.S. NYE, Power and Interdependence, Little, Brown, and Company, Boston/
Toronto, 1977, pp.5-21 and, idem. 4th ed., 2012, pp.8-17.
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migration flows, capital flows, and information flows between their territories. The
more there are such interactions between the states in a given international system,
the higher is their degree of interconnectedness. When those interactions create costs,
when states are all “significantly affected by external forces”, Keohane and Nye no
longer speak of mere interconnectedness but of interdependence.4 When the actors
in an international system have the ability to produce costs for each other, they are
interdependent. These costs created by interactions among countries may or may not
be intentional. The existence of costs is not incompatible with the existence of gains
associated for different actors by the same interactions, even for different actors
within the same country. In a situation of interdependence then, politics matters, i.e.
actors use their capabilities to maximise their gains and minimise their costs. These
political relationships may in some circumstances lead to international treaties, and
to the creation of international organisations with institutions to make transactions
between states and to monitor those agreements. This article will show that increased
migration across the Mediterranean has created not only interconnectedness between
the countries of the Mediterranean basin, but also interdependence. It will show also
the interdependence created by migration flows has determined multiple types of
relationships between Mediterranean states, which are at the centre of the dynamics
that led to the Euro-Mediterranean framework established by the Barcelona Confer-
ence in November 1995.
This study is based on the use of three separate archival holdings: the documents
of the EEC and EU Council of Ministers relating to migration flows in the Mediter-
ranean; the documents of the Elysée during the François Mitterrand presidency re-
lating to the negotiation and implementation of the Schengen Agreements; and the
documents of the Council of Europe on the migration flows in the Mediterranean.
These archives show the actions of the main international organisations to shape the
international order in the area, namely the EU and the Council of Europe, gathering
the most powerful states in the area. The documents of these organisations also give
a statistical picture of the flows in the Mediterranean basin. French documents allow
for a better understanding of the French strategy, highly influential in these episodes.
The article will first present how increasing migration flows in the 1980s produced
interdependence in the Mediterranean, creating costs in Southern European countries.
It then shows how Southern European states used their capabilities to reduce the
migration flows from Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries, under the im-
petus of France. Finally the article will demonstrate how trans-Mediterranean
cooperation developed to reduce the migration pressure from Eastern and Southern
Mediterranean countries to Northern Mediterranean countries.
4. R.O. KEOHANE, J.S. NYE (1977), op.cit., p.8.
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Increasing Migration
The increase in migration in the Mediterranean in the 1980s was a source of inter-
dependence in the region. Emigration pressure was high in the East and South of the
Mediterranean. This was first and foremost the result of the borderline that the
Mediterranean constituted between rich and poor countries, in an era of rising in-
equalities between rich and poor countries at the global level. The ratio of incomes
of the twenty per cent of people in the world living in the richest countries, compared
to the twenty per cent living in the poorest countries, increased from 30 to 1 in 1960
to 74 to 1 in 1997.5 Alongside the economic imbalance between Mediterranean coun-
tries, the demographic imbalance also increased. The labour force in the countries
between Turkey and Morocco rose sharply in the 1980s. Each year, the annual in-
crease in the labour force exceeded two million people, while it was only about
450,000 people in the EEC. To cope with the increased workforce, Turkey and Egypt
would have had to grow by 880,000 new jobs each year for ten years.6 Over the period
from 1985 to 1990, the fertility rate in North African countries was more than five
children per woman, against only 1.6 in Western Europe. The population was to
increase by 50 million people in the 1990s.7 Given this context, Southern Mediter-
ranean governments favoured emigration to avoid rising unemployment and to in-
crease remittances.8 Finally, the wars in Algeria and Bosnia from 1992 onwards cre-
ated migration flows, in part towards other Mediterranean countries.9 To sum up,
increased economic and demographic imbalances between the two sides of the
Mediterranean, promotion of emigration by Southern Mediterranean governments,
and armed conflicts were to cause ever-increasing migration to EEC Mediterranean
countries.
These increasing migration flows between Mediterranean countries created
greater interconnectedness between those countries. Italy, Spain, Greece and Portugal
5. J.S. NYE, Understanding International Conflicts: An Introduction to Theory and History, Pearson
Longman, New York, 2005, p.196.
6. ACCUE [Archives centrales du Conseil de l’Union européenne], Liste Rouge 68830, Rapport d'ex-
perts de la Commission au Conseil du 10.10.1990 sur les politiques d'immigration et d’intégration
sociale des immigrés dans la Communauté européenne, 16.03.1990-13.04.1992. SEC (90) 1813 final.
7. R. KING, Migration and the Single Market for Labour: An Issue in Regional Development, in: M.
BLACKSELL, A.M. WILLIAMS (eds) The European Challenge: Geography and Development in
the European Community, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1994, p.240.
8. ACE [Archives du Conseil de l’Europe, documents en ligne sur : http://www.coe.int/lportal/web/coe-
portal]. Doc.6266, Migrants maghrébins en Europe. Rapport d’Antonio Romero (Espagne) et Jean-
Pierre Worms (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 12.07.1990.
9. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 18371, Groupe coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes». Réunions
et travaux. CIRC 3642/92. Conclusions du Groupe des Coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des per-
sonnes», 26-27.05.1992).
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became new immigration countries.10 In the late 1980s, the number of foreigners in
those countries was around two millions, half of them in Italy. The immigrants
amounted then to around 2 per cent of Italy’s population. Spain had about 650,000
foreigners, Greece nearly 200,000 and Portugal 150,000. Not all of these came from
the Mediterranean basin, but there were many Tunisians, Egyptians and Yugoslavs
in Italy, the latter especially in the Northern regions. Tunisian labourers were em-
ployed in Tuscany and Sicily. Tunisians and Egyptians worked as seamen by Greek
or Sicilian ship owners. Senegalese street hawkers began to work in major cities.
Similarly Eritreans, Ethiopians, Somalis and Sudanese came to Italy from further
South. Origin countries of immigrants in Italy included Morocco, Tunisia, Yu-
goslavia, Albania and Senegal. In Spain, Algerians and Moroccans especially were
numerous. Agricultural workers from Morocco multiplied in Catalonia. In Portugal,
agricultural labourers from Cape Verde were employed in the Algarve. Cape Verdean
women worked as housemaids in Portugal and other Mediterranean countries.
The interconnectedness between Mediterranean countries created by migration
flows was also interdependence because of the costs associated with these migratory
movements. Although a factor of growth, these flows imposed costs on certain actors
in the immigration countries of Southern Europe, first and foremost among local
unskilled workers.11 In Spain, unemployment had risen dramatically in the previous
decade, first because of diminishing emigration opportunities to Western Europe from
1973 onwards and second because of the high employment protection in Spain in-
herited from the period of the dictatorship. The unemployment rate thus rose from
2.62% of the active population in 1974 to 14.35% in 1981.12 Immigration could create
in Spain increased competition for the access of local workers to the few available
jobs.
Moreover, and in part because of high employment protection in Southern Euro-
pean countries, an important part of the new immigration to those countries took place
through clandestine channels and fuelled the underground labour market. Local
workers were then all the more threatened. Among the million foreigners in Italy in
the late 1980s, almost 40 per cent were clandestine according to the Consiglio
Nazionale dell’Economia e del Lavoro (National Council of Economy and Labour).
This proportion reached more than 33 per cent in Greece and Portugal, and even 45
per cent in Spain. In the mid-1980s, the number of illegal foreign workers in Greece
would have reached 70,000 according to a report of the EEC Economic and Social
10. For this paragraph: ACE, Doc.6211, Nouveaux pays d'immigration. Rapport d’Alfons Cucó Giner
(Espagne), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 24.04.1990; R. KING,
op.cit., pp.234-235; T. PERLMUTTER, Immigration Politics Italian Style: The Paradoxical Be-
haviour of Mainstream and Populist Parties, in: South European Society and Politics, 1(1996), p.
233.
11. For this paragraph and the next: ACCUE, Liste Rouge 32095, Avis de la section des affaires sociales
du CES. sur les travailleurs migrants, 16.07.1984; CES 694/83, Projet de rapport de M. Dassis; ACE,
Doc.6211, op.cit.
12. A. DESDENTADO BONETE, I. CRUZ ROCHE, Las prestaciones de desempleo ante la crisis, in:
Papeles de Economia Española, 12/13(1983), pp. 317-335.
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Committee. In the early 1990s, the estimation of the number of irregular migrants in
Italy had increased to between 600,000 and 1,000,000. The underground labour mar-
ket benefitted from the small size of Italian businesses and from the importance of
domestic work. The small size, weak organisation and marginality of some firms in
Southern European economies made them difficult to control.13 Irregular employ-
ment was particularly widespread in the building, mining, textiles, clothing, footwear
and farming sectors. Illegal employment, without contracts and characterized by easy
dismissals, wages 35% lower than those in the legal market on average, and often
below the legal minimum wage, opened admittedly greater employment opportunities
in the countries on the North of the Mediterranean basin to migrants from the poorer
South. But its expansion jeopardized the wage levels and the employment protection
that local unskilled legal workers in immigration countries wanted to preserve. In-
deed, as the labour supply in the clandestine labour market was high, some employers
had an incentive to resort to that alternative market, decreasing the labour demand on
the legal labour market, unless local workers accepted similar wages or working
conditions to those practiced in the clandestine market. As a result, local unions mo-
bilized against illegal employment. By the early 1980s, the Greek General Confed-
eration of Labour asked the Ministry of National Economy to reduce illegal work.
Local unions feared including immigrant workers in their strategies, because of the
conflicting interests between those workers and the unions’ core members. As a result,
in France, Maghreb immigrants preferred their own associations to local unions, and
immigrant workers were barely represented in local unions.14 Local workers, repre-
sented by local unions, could thus experience costs if poor immigration continued,
because of declining wages and deteriorating working conditions.
In addition, Southern European governments more directly experienced costs be-
cause of trans-Mediterranean immigration. Undeclared work did indeed constitute a
significant lack of revenue for public finances, given the high numbers of illegal
foreign workers. The underground economy, fed by the work of illegal immigrants,
would have already amounted to 5% of Spanish GDP in the mid-1980s and between
20 and 30% of Italian GDP.15 Moreover a clandestine existence could lead immigrants
into violence and sometimes crime, leading to higher public security expenditure.16
A 1990 report produced by the Council of Europe about the new immigration coun-
tries of Southern Europe underlined the high rate of foreign criminality in those
countries.17 In reaction, the Italian government offered, from 1986 onwards, amnesty
programmes for clandestine immigrants who were in work. Nevertheless, these pro-
grammes were a failure and, by the deadline of 30 September 1988, very few immi-
13. ACE, MMP (91) 4, Migratory movements from Central and East European countries to Western
Europe. Document submitted by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), Strasbourg,
1991.
14. ACE, Doc.6266, op.cit.
15. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
16. ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
17. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
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grants had legalised their status. The larger underground economy, which their jobs
were part of, prevented them from declaring their status.
Increasing migration flows across the Mediterranean therefore imposed costs on
unions and governments in immigration countries. These costs transformed the in-
terconnectedness between Mediterranean countries produced by those increasing mi-
gration flows into interdependence.
Policies to Reduce Immigration
The first movement of EEC Mediterranean member states to manage that interde-
pendence was to adopt policies to reduce immigration from other Mediterranean
countries, without negotiation with Southern Mediterranean governments. First,
Southern European governments supported the West German government, in the
early and mid-1980s, in the violation of the agreement between the EEC and Turkey
regarding the free movement of workers. In Article 12 of the 1963 Ankara Association
Agreement with Turkey and Article 36 of the 1970 Additional Protocol to the Asso-
ciation Agreement, the EEC had committed to achieve the free movement of workers
with Turkey by 1 December 1986 at the latest. Already in April 1981, in line with
German views, the Ministers of Labour and Social Affairs of EEC member states
agreed that this commitment could not be respected. As the West German Minister
for Foreign Affairs Hans-Dietrich Genscher wrote to the president of the EEC Com-
mission, in June 1981, the situation of the German labour market explained the Ger-
man position.18 At the end of November 1986 the EEC made a final offer to Turkey
that was far from the free movement originally planned. In the negotiations between
member states on the final offer, in October and November 1986, the Greek delegation
supported the German delegation in considering that family reunification should be
excluded from the proposal.19 Greece wanted to limit family migration from Turkey,
whereas this type of migration had become more important since the official stop to
labour recruitment in the early 1970s. More radically, Greece wanted to include in
the text of the proposal that immigration states could suspend the application of the
proposal “for reasons of national security”.20 As the text of the proposal did not in-
clude this, the Greek delegation raised a general reservation regarding the proposal.
Greece should be able to oppose the installation of Turkish migrants within its terri-
tory, particularly in areas that might be subject to territorial claims.
18. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74534, Libre circulation des travailleurs; problèmes d'application de la déci-
sion n°1/80 du Conseil d'Association CEE-Turquie, 01.06.1981.
19. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74145, Turquie. Avant-projet de décision du Conseil d'association relative à
la mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'Accord CEE-Turquie (libre circulation des travailleurs),
14.10.1986. TR 15/86 REV. 1, Note de la présidence.
20. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74142, Turquie. Communication de la Commission au Conseil concernant la
mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'accord d'Ankara, 14.10.1986. TR 14/86 REV. 1, Rapport du Comité
“Associations pays tiers/Turquie” au Coreper.
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Moreover, according to the Community proposal, Turkish workers were not to
benefit from Community priority for access to employment in the member states. The
workers of the member states enjoyed priority for jobs within the Community ac-
cording to Regulation number 1612 of 1968. To implement this priority, member
states’ employment offices exchanged their job offers before transmitting them to
third countries. Nevertheless, Turkish workers were expected, according to the pro-
posal, to benefit from a secondary priority. Once the exchange of job offers between
member states had proven that there were no Community workers to fill in the job
vacancies, then, according to the proposal, job offers could be transmitted to the
Turkish employment office before the employment offices of other third countries.
However, the proposal included two limitations. First, this secondary priority was not
compulsory: the member state with job offers might or might not ask the Commission
for this secondary priority to be implemented. Second, when the Commission trans-
mitted job offers to Turkey, the Commission transmitted them again, simultaneously
to the employment offices of other member states. With this second provision, the
member states that were, within the Community, emigration countries benefitted from
an additional protection to ensure that they actually had no workers to fill in the job
vacancies and, eventually, to ensure the priority of their workers within the Commu-
nity.21 At that time, Mediterranean EEC member states could be either labour-im-
porting states in general or labour-exporting states within the Community. With these
two limitations to the priority for Turkish workers, Mediterranean EEC member states
were in a position to limit Turkish immigration on their territories or elsewhere in the
Community. Nevertheless, the decision not to respect the commitments taken in 1963
and 1970 was met with bitterness by the Turkish government, which rejected the EEC
proposal of November 1986.22 The situation of Turkish workers and members of their
families in the EEC remained governed by the provisions of a 1980 decision of the
EEC-Turkey Association Council (Decision 1/80 of 19 September 1980).23
EEC Mediterranean member states also agreed, in the course of their accession to
Schengen Agreements, to French demands regarding their visa policies, so as to re-
strict Mediterranean immigration. The migration policy of the French government
was determined, under both left-wing and right-wing parliamentary majorities, by
the situation of the French labour market, which did not allow for the integration of
additional unskilled workers. By the late 1980s, Mediterranean member states other
than France had not developed restrictive immigration policies towards Eastern and
Southern Mediterranean countries. The will to maintain good relationships with those
21. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74148, Turquie. Avant-projet de décision du Conseil d'association relative à
la mise en œuvre de l'article 12 de l'Accord CEE-Turquie, 06.10.1988-28.01.1992. 10791/86 NT
24. Position de la Communauté approuvée par le Conseil du 24 novembre 1986.
22. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74534, Libre circulation des travailleurs; problèmes d'application de la déci-
sion n°1/80 du Conseil d'Association CEE-Turquie. Ali Bozer (Ministre d'État chargé des relations
avec les Communautés européennes) au Président du Conseil des Communautés européennes,
21.11.1986.
23. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 68422, Rapport de la Commission au Conseil du 22.06.1989 sur l’intégration
sociale des migrants des pays tiers résidant de façon légale et permanente dans les États membres.
SEC (89) 924 final.
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countries prevented them from doing so. Italy and Spain, the main immigration coun-
tries among Mediterranean member states, did not demand visas for nationals of
Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Yugoslavia, and Turkey, although those were the main
Mediterranean emigration countries towards the EEC. Portugal did not require visas
from Turkish and Yugoslav nationals, and Greece did not impose visa requirements
on Moroccan and Tunisian nationals.24 The French strategy in negotiating Schengen
Agreements with only Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxemburg was
intended to develop common restrictive immigration regulations. Indeed those four
states had similar policies to France in this field. Applicant states to Schengen Agree-
ments would have to fully accept previously negotiated provisions. The abolition of
controls at internal borders was a key element of the new Single Market and the
Mediterranean EEC member countries, which had benefitted from the Common
Market, would want to join Schengen Agreements.
When Italy asked to participate in the negotiations, deploring to be excluded from
the reduced Schengen Group, the position of the French government was to accept
Italian membership once the agreements were signed, provided that Italy accepted all
the provisions of these agreements. Already in a December 1988 note, the cabinet
director of the French Minister for European Affairs, Georges Chacornac, stated:
“We have no reservation in principle to the Italian accession to the Schengen Agreement,
provided that Italy accepts […] all the provisions of the existing agreement”.25
The main preoccupation for the French government had to do with the requirement
of visas for the nationals of Maghreb countries, Yugoslavia, and Turkey.26 The French
government even seemed to consider that the mechanism of the negotiation to join
Schengen Agreements, as Chacornac put it, “would give the Italians the pretext they
needed to explain to the Yugoslavs why they were imposing the visa”.27 This idea of
a useful “vincolo esterno” for the Italian government, similar to that in the economic
and financial area, did not necessarily fit completely with the preferences of the Italian
government.28 The Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, Giulio Andreotti, indeed tes-
tified before the Italian parliament on 26 January 1989 that Schengen “created not a
few difficulties” with North African countries and Turkey.29
Nevertheless, the incentive to join Schengen Agreements, the determination of
France on visa issues, and finally the incentive of EEC Mediterranean governments
to reduce immigration were enough to lead them, by the early 1990s, to define a
24. AN [Archives nationales, Paris], Archives d’Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 68, dossier 1, Accords
de Schengen sur la libre circulation des personnes et des biens. 1988-1989. Jean-Marc Sauvé (Di-
recteur des Libertés publiques et des Affaires juridiques au ministère de l’Intérieur) au Premier
Ministre, 06 février 1989.
25. Ibid., Note de Georges Chacornac (Directeur de cabinet du ministre des Affaires européennes) pour
le Ministre, 09.12.1988.
26. Ibid., Jean-Marc Sauvé au Premier Ministre, 06.02.1989.
27. Ibid., Note de Georges Chacornac, op.cit., 09.12.1988.
28. A. VARSORI, La Cenerentola d'Europa? l'Italia e l'integrazione europea dal 1947 a oggi, Rub-
bettino, Soveria Mannelli, 2010, p.370.
29. Camera dei Deputati, 1990b, 72, S3. Quoted by: T. PERLMUTTER, op.cit., p.249.
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restrictive visa policy towards other Mediterranean countries. As early as May 1989,
the Spanish coordinator for the free movement of persons to the EEC Council of
Ministers, Rafael Pastor, indicated to Élisabeth Guigou, special assistant to François
Mitterrand for European Affairs, that “Spain had decided to request visas for Mo-
roccans, Algerians and Tunisians, and that it would be announced in October”.30
France, Germany, The Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg finally signed the Con-
vention implementing the first Schengen Agreement in June 1990. The visa policy
defined in the Convention was restrictive, an agreement having been reached during
the negotiations on a long list of countries that were to be subject to visa requirements,
to the delight of the French government, with only the case of Yugoslavia remaining
under negotiation between Germany and France.31 The negotiations for membership
could then proceed, requiring other EEC member states to follow the provisions of
the Schengen Convention on visa policy. As early as 1991, ten out of twelve EEC
member states required visas for the nationals of all Arab countries.32
Finally, EEC and then EU Mediterranean countries agreed to strengthen border
controls to comply with the requirements of Schengen Agreements. EEC Mediter-
ranean member states other than France had until then been reluctant to implement
stricter border controls for fear of harming their important tourism sectors.33 What
mattered for the French government was to stop poor, trans-Mediterranean immi-
grants as much as possible at the border. It did not want its efforts to restrain immi-
gration from Mediterranean poor countries jeopardized by Mediterranean member
states. It was an event to be feared if EEC Mediterranean member states were inte-
grated into the Schengen area. In March 1989, the French Minister of the Interior,
Pierre Joxe, wrote to the Prime Minister Michel Rocard and to François Mitterrand:
“What if tomorrow a serious political and social crisis in any of the Maghreb countries
brought here waves of asylum seekers driven by perfectly justified motives, both political
and economic”?
In September 1989, Jean-Marc Sauvé, Director of Civil Liberties and Legal Affairs
at the French Ministry of the Interior referred in the EEC Council of Ministers to
Mediterranean member states and Italy in particular when stressing “border control
difficulties in countries rendered […] vulnerable by very long maritime borders”.
According to him, this favoured “increased penetration of the European area”.34
30. AN, Archives d'Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 69, dossier 1, Préparation des accords de Schengen
[…]. Compte rendu de ma rencontre avec MM. Yanes et Pons, conseillers de Felipe Gonzales, à
Madrid, le 23 mai 1989.
31. AN, Archives d'Élisabeth Guigou, 5 AG 4 / EG 67, dossier 2. Préparation des négociations dans le
cadre des accords de Schengen […]. Note du Directeur adjoint du Cabinet du ministre des Affaires
européennes relative à la réunion ministérielle des 12 et 13 novembre à Bonn, 14.11.1989.
32. Article of Serge de Waersegger in: Le Soir, 11.06.1991.
33. ACE. Doc.6211, op.cit.
34. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 1575, Travaux du Groupe des coordonnateurs (libre circulation des person-
nes). 3/2. 26.06.1989-30.10.1989. Réunion du groupe des coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des
personnes», 15.09.1989.
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The Italian government readily followed French recommendations in this area as
well. In February 1990, the Martelli law redefined Italian immigration law in a re-
strictive way. The Socialist leader Claudio Martelli was at this time the Vice-president
of the Council of Ministers, the second highest post in the government. In March
1990, he proposed using the army to patrol the coastline. In the Schengen Central
Negotiating Group, on 31 May 1990, with regard to the Italian Schengen candidacy,
the French delegation stressed “the need, […] in clear and concrete terms, for common
rules on the control of external borders”.35 To facilitate its accession to Schengen
Agreements, in November 1990, Italy informed other member states that it was about
to adopt a new legislation to “control growing migration flows”.36 Italy also led de-
terrent action in 1991 when it announced a state of emergency to drive back Albanian
boat people and it later expelled about 20,000 Albanians.37 Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Greece joined Schengen Agreements between November 1990 and November 1992,
readily agreeing to the policy of closing off trans-Mediterranean migration that France
requested. This policy did however cause tensions in the Mediterranean area.
Trans-Mediterranean Cooperation
Migration protectionism did not remove the interdependence between the countries
of the Mediterranean basin. The migratory pressure in the Mediterranean continued
to impose costs in EEC Mediterranean countries, leading EEC Mediterranean states
to extend their cooperation with other Mediterranean states. Migration remained a
major development lever for non-EEC Mediterranean countries. Migration regulated
the imbalances between labour supply and labour demand in these countries, and
contributed to the training of the workforce. Migrant workers were the source of
significant financial transfers. Remittances in 1988 amounted to 22.5% of export
revenue for Tunisia, and 35.6% for Morocco.38 This migratory lever of development
had become important given that the accession to the EEC of Greece (1981) and
Portugal and Spain (1986) limited the access of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean
agricultural products to European markets.39 The migratory pressure was, in the late
35. AN, Archives d’Alain Holleville, Adjoint officieux d'Élisabeth Guigou pour les affaires européennes
et les sommets (1989-1990). 5 AG 4 / AH 18, dossier 1. Accords de Schengen. 1989-1990. Compte
rendu de la réunion du Groupe central de négociation, 31.05.1990.
36. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 43450, Groupe coordonnateurs «Libre circulation des personnes». Conclu-
sions de la réunion du Groupe des coordonnateurs du 16 novembre 1990 à Rome. Communication
de l’ambassadeur Calamia.
37. ACE, Doc.6817, Migrations clandestines: passeurs et employeurs de migrants clandestins. Rapport
de Christos Pahtas (Grèce). Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population, 26.04.1993.
38. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Traitement par l'Assemblée sur les répercussions de la création du
Marché unique de 1992 sur les travailleurs migrants des P.V.D. Parlement européen. A3-0393/91.
Rapport de José Mendes Bota, au nom du Comité sur le développement et la coopération,
20.12.1991.
39. R. EDIS, Does the Barcelona process matter?, in: Mediterranean Politics, 3(1998), p.94.
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1980s, stronger than ever. The presence of immigrant communities from the South
in Northern Mediterranean countries created poles of attraction for chain migration.
Clandestine immigration networks dispatched migrants to the hubs of undeclared
work. Boats with crew and passengers carried away by the sea washed up regularly
on Southern European shores, indirectly demonstrating the continuing migratory
flow.40 This pressure, in spite of closure policies, created persistent costs for Southern
European governments, leading them to tackle the causes of migration pressure in
the Mediterranean more thoroughly.
In the early 1990s, the governments of Mediterranean member states expressed
to their European partners the importance of further trans-Mediterranean cooperation,
in order to favour the development of Eastern and Southern Mediterranean countries.
In September 1990, the Spanish and Italian Foreign Ministers, Fernández Ordóñez
and Gianni De Michelis, jointly proposed dedicating 0.25% of the EEC GDP to foster
economic growth in the Southern Mediterranean countries, in exchange for a com-
mitment from beneficiary countries to reduce the migration flow to the North.41 In
March 1991, the Italian government organised jointly with the OECD an International
Conference on Migration Flows in Rome.42 In a December 1991 report on behalf of
the Committee on Development of the European Parliament, the Portuguese member
of the European Parliament José Mendes Bota invited the Parliament to adopt a res-
olution to regret that
“no action [had] yet been taken to implement the provisions concerning cooperation in the
area of labour included in the cooperation agreements concluded since 1977 between the
EEC and Maghreb countries”.43
Finally, in his opinion on the 1991 activities of the OECD regarding migration and
demography, on behalf of the Committee on Migration, Refugees and Population of
the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, the French deputy François
Grussenmeyer also considered that it would be advantageous to “link […] the granting
of development assistance to the implementation of family planning programmes in
the beneficiary countries”.44 In various frameworks, the representatives of Southern
European countries thus tried to draw the attention of other European governments
to the situation of Southern Mediterranean countries and to encourage them to accept
deeper cooperation with Southern and Eastern Mediterranean states, including de-
velopment aid, labour and demographic policies.
With this perspective, EEC policies to reduce the pressure to migrate northward
in the countries of the Southern Mediterranean came under consideration. As early
40. ACE, Doc.6211, op.cit.
41. International Herald Tribune, 25.09.1990. Cited by: ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
42. ACE, Doc.6491, Activités de l'OCDE en 1990 dans le domaine de migration et de démographie.
Avis de M. François Grussenmeyer (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la
population, 12.09.1991.
43. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, A3-0393/91, op.cit.
44. ACE, Doc. 6658, Activités de l'OCDE en 1991 en matière de migrations et de démographie. Avis
de François Grussenmeyer (France), Commission des migrations, des réfugiés et de la population
15.09.1992.
Migration and Regional Interdependence in the Mediterranean (1980s-Mid 1990s) 119
as March 1990, the European Commissioner for Mediterranean and Latin American
policy, Abel Matatues of Spain, envisaged a plan to reduce emigration from the four-
teen non-EEC countries bordering the Mediterranean by allowing greater access for
products from those countries to European markets.45 A September 1990 report of
experts produced at the request of the European Commission considered that “po-
pulation pressure from poor countries [was] probably one of the major problems of
our time”. The report called for a
“quantitative and qualitative strengthening of the forms of cooperation for the economic
and social development of these countries and [for a] coordinated support to their possible
population management programmes”.46
In a May 1992 resolution, on the basis of the report prepared by the Portuguese MEP
José Mendes Bota, the European Parliament regretted the lack of cooperation with
Maghreb countries in the area of labour, as proposed by Bota, and considered that the
EEC should use its aid policy to encourage “labour intensive” activities in emigration
countries, to promote, throughout the countries of the Southern Mediterranean, “re-
gional cooperation policies that [would take] due account of the potential and the
problems […] of intra-regional migration” and to obtain “the establishment and im-
plementation of demographic policies on the part of the developing countries con-
cerned”.47 Within European institutions, such as the European Commission and the
European Parliament, Southern European representatives thus managed to convince
their European partners to go forward in cooperating with Mediterranean countries.
The importance of migratory pressure in the interdependence between the various
countries of the region translated in the fact that the main considered themes of co-
operation were intended to reduce migratory pressure in origin countries.
More broadly, this resulted in the creation of new institutions to implement the
contemplated policies and manage Mediterranean interdependence. This creation of
institutions was part and parcel of the dynamics leading to the partnership envisaged
at the Barcelona Conference and to the Union for the Mediterranean. A European
Centre for Global Interdependence and Solidarity was first established by the Council
of Europe in Lisbon in May 1990. In 1992 it was to start a pilot project on trans-
Mediterranean interdependence; the project intended to focus on measures to manage
the changing relationships in the region.48 A migratory observation centre was pro-
vided for in the EEC budget in 1991: with an allocation of ECU 1,000,000, it was to
monitor migration flows in the Mediterranean and assess the extent to which Com-
munity development projects had contributed to the creation of local jobs and the
containment of emigration.49 On the model of the Conferences on Security and Co-
operation in Europe in the 1970s and 1980s between Western and Eastern Europe, a
45. Financial Times, 11.03.1990. Cited by: ACE, MMP (91) 4, op.cit.
46. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 68830, SEC (90) 1813 final, op.cit.
47. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Procès-verbal de la séance du 14 mai 1992. Résolution A3-0393/91.
48. ACE, CM/Del/Dec(92)469, 469e réunion. Immigration de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée et du monde
musulman, 23.01.1992.
49. ACCUE, Liste Rouge 74814, Rapport A3-0393/91, op.cit.
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Conference on Security and Co-operation in the Mediterranean (CSCM) was held in
June 1992, in Malaga (Spain), on the initiative of Italy and Spain.50 Armed conflicts
in the Mediterranean basin had then dramatic consequences on migration flows. In
that context, the June 1994 Corfu European Council, under Greek Presidency, in-
structed the Commission to prepare a more comprehensive strategy for the Mediter-
ranean. This led to the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership initiative, developed in 1995
under the French and Spanish presidencies of the European Council, leading finally
to the agreement adopted by the 15 EU states and their 12 Mediterranean partners, at
Barcelona on 28 November 1995.51 The partnership was intended to establish a free
trade area in the Mediterranean by 2010, in order to substitute trade flows to migration
flows.52 Unsurprisingly, Maghreb governments were concerned that the principle of
the free circulation of persons was not recognized within that partnership.53 The in-
terdependence produced by migratory pressure in the Mediterranean thus led to more
comprehensive cooperation in a variety of fields, with the creation of new institutions.
However, in spite of these institutional steps, the policies actually implemented
remained reduced due to the limited interest on these issues in Northern Europe. This
aspect has already been well developed by previous studies. As underlined by the
political scientist Richard Gillespie, “crucial decisions affecting EU Mediterranean
policy [needed] Northern European support”, for economic and financial reasons:
those countries would have to pay the largest share of aid.54 Northern European go-
vernments accepted Mediterranean cooperation in the context of the outbreak of vi-
olence in Algeria from 1992 onwards. As Gillespie considered, this event triggered
“a gradual realisation that the Maghreb, in particular, is of importance to the entire
European Union”, creating greater security concerns about an Islamist challenge.55
Moreover, the Spanish Prime Minister Felipe González threatened to block progress
towards the Eastern enlargement of the EU without EU commitments in the Mediter-
ranean region.56 Nevertheless, the Northern European commitment remained limited.
Within the European Population Committee of the Council of Europe in January
1992, the representative of the United Kingdom believed that the study of demo-
graphic imbalances between the countries of the Mediterranean basin was not a pri-
ority and that it was not clear that such a study was actually relevant in that commit-
tee’s tasks.57 While the Spanish Commissioner Manuel Marín had sought ECU 5.5
billion for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership funding package, this amount was
reduced by Northern European governments to ECU 4,685 million. Rather than direct
aid, Northern European governments preferred that Eastern and Southern Mediter-
50. Inter-Parliamentary Union website: http://www.ipu.org/iss-e/cscm.htm.
51. R. EDIS, 1998, op.cit., pp.95-96.
52. M. MONTANARI, The Barcelona Process and the Political Economy of Euro-Mediterranean Tra-
de Integration, in: JCMS, 5(2007), pp.1011-1012.
53. R. EDIS, op.cit., p.96.
54. M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1017.
55. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., pp.67-68.
56. El forcejeo con Alemania, in: El País, 20.11.1995; Commission of the European Communities, 1994,
cited by: R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.68.
57. ACE, CM/Del/Dec(92)469, op.cit.
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ranean countries created the conditions to attract foreign direct investment. As com-
puted by the political scientist Marco Montanari, the financial resources allocated by
the EU to partner Mediterranean countries amounted to 33 € per capita during the
2000-2006 period, while this amount was 209 € per capita for Central and Eastern
European countries over the same period.58 Richard Gillespie has already summa-
rized it: “German, British and Scandinavian priorities continued to relate to Central
and Eastern Europe”.59 Even on capital flows the impact of the Barcelona Process
was limited. The main destination of EU foreign direct investment remained Central
and Eastern Europe, reaching 21 billion Euros in 2000, against only 4 billion Euros
towards Mediterranean countries.60 The limited involvement of the wealthiest and
most powerful European states in the Mediterranean limited the ability of Southern
European governments to manage Mediterranean interdependence in a favourable
way.
Conclusion
To conclude, the migratory factor was a key factor of interdependence in the Mediter-
ranean region and explains significantly the dynamics that shaped the relationships
between Mediterranean states from the 1980s onwards. Increased trans-Mediter-
ranean migration flows from the 1980s onwards interconnected the countries of the
Mediterranean basin and made all Southern European countries immigration coun-
tries. In destination countries, there were winners and losers in this increased inter-
connectedness. The employment protection of local unskilled workers was threatened
by poor immigration and threw immigrant workers into the underground labour mar-
ket and sometimes into criminality. The costs then created by immigration for local
workers and governments explain why Southern European governments used their
capabilities to close their borders to immigration. Even if it was largely one Southern
European government that drove this process, namely the French government, it
seems that other Southern European governments were ready to implement some
immigration closure. All Southern European governments recognized however that
mere closure was not a way to eliminate the costs associated with interdependence.
It was then necessary for Southern European governments to complement immigra-
tion closure with cooperation to reduce emigration pressure in origin countries: this
required policies to promote labour-intensive industries in those countries, trade
agreements, as well as policies of demographic control. This dynamic, which included
in itself a part of institution building, is at the heart of the dynamics leading to the
Barcelona Process and to the Union for the Mediterranean. Projects of trade liberal-
ization, international division of labour, population control, constituting the core of
that process, were intended to reduce local migratory pressure. Nevertheless, this
58. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.67; R. EDIS, 1998, op.cit., p.98; M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1020.
59. R. GILLESPIE, op.cit., p.69.
60. M. MONTANARI, op.cit., p.1028.
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strategy has not managed to solve the problem of international inequalities in the
Mediterranean basin. Major donors of EU policies in the Mediterranean, namely
Northern European countries, had a limited interest in this area, explaining their re-
luctance to support greater financial aid to the area. This article has highlighted a
major dynamic leading to the Barcelona Process. It has demonstrated how the mi-
gratory factor created interdependence between Southern European countries and
other Mediterranean countries. It has demonstrated as well the channels through
which Southern European governments came to try to manage that interdependence.
The interdependence created by the migration factor kept increasing in the following
years. The migration factor has never been as relevant as in the last years in Mediter-
ranean interdependence. The various barriers to immigration in Southern European
countries in the context of the recent recession have contributed to destabilise eco-
nomically and politically Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries. Inversely,
the migration flows created by subsequent Arab uprisings and civil wars have created
much pressure on EU countries and led to ever increasing EU involvement in the
area.
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